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Direct Inference, Probability, and a Conceptual Gulf in Risk
Communication
Vern R. Walker’
Received December 23, 1994; revised June 2, 1995

Differences in the conceptual frameworks of scientists and nonscientists may create barriers to risk
communication. This article examines two such conceptual problems. First, the logic of “direct
inference” from group statistics to probabilities about specific individuals suggests that individuals
might be acting rationally in refusing to apply to themselves the conclusions of regulatory risk
assessments. Second, while regulators and risk assessment scientists often use an “objectivist” or
‘‘relative frequency” interpretation of probability statements, members of the public are more likely
to adopt a “subjectivist” or “degree of confidence” interpretation when estimating their personal
risks, and either misunderstand or significantly discount the relevance of risk assessment conclusions. If these analyses of inference and probability are correct, there may be a conceptual gulf at
the center of risk communication that cannot be bridged by additional data about the magnitude
of group risk. Suggestions are made for empirical studies that might help regulators deal with this
conceptual gulf.
KEY WORDS: Direct inference; probability; risk communication; risk perception; uncertainty; variability;
personal risk.

1. INTRODUCTION

ditional empirical studies about group risks. This conceptual difference has important implications when
designing empirical studies into risk perception and risk
communication, and suggests several hypotheses for future research.

Risk communication sometimes takes place across
a conceptual gulf between two groups with different perspectives. On the one hand, regulators and public health
scientists make predictions about the incidence of injury
or disease within groups. On the other hand, members
of the public are often concerned with the probability of
injury for specific individuals. This article explores certain confusions caused by the differences between these
conceptual frameworks. The discussion is divided into
two major issues: (1) the direct inference from statistics
about groups to probabilities for specific individuals, and
(2) different interpretations given to such probability
statements. The main thesis is that the conceptual gulf
is fundamental and has a logical basis, and might not be
bridged, or even significantly narrowed, merely by ad-

2. DIRECT INFERENCES FROM GROUPS TO
INDIVIDUALS
2.1. Groups vs. Individuals
Regulators and the public health community are
naturally concerned with characteristics of groups. First,
they typically rely upon data from groups in arriving at
a risk assessment-whether the data are from animal
studies or epidemiologic studies. Second, they use such
data to make predictions about groups, by using either
statistical models (estimating population parameters) or
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probability models (combining statistical data with
causal theories). Third, action alternatives are often evaluated by their effects upon different groups of potentially affected persons. Finally, the regulatory agency
naturally conceives of its political constituencies as organized into groups having a commonality of interest.
Due in part to this natural orientation toward
groups, regulators and public health scientists tend to
avoid making inferences from information about groups
to conclusions about specific individuals.“) By contrast,
consumers of risk information do attempt to reach conclusions about specific individuals based on statistical
information about groups. When I acquire risk information about groups (e.g., Americans who do not
smoke, males over age 40), I try to use it to reach conclusions about risk to myself or to specific others (e.g.,
my father). Philosophers have called this “direct infere n ~ e , ” ‘ ~and
. ~ )have studied the logical problem of determining when there is sufficient information to
warrant the direct inference. For example, if 5% of people in a group are likely to incur a particular injury, what
more do we need to know before we are warranted in
concluding that a specific individual in that group has a
0.05 probability of suffering that injury?
2.2. A Data Gap in Individuating Risk Factors
Several philosophers, representing different theoretical camps, have recently argued that a prerequisite
for a direct inference from group to individual is either
complete knowledge(4)or ‘‘total evidence.”c2) The key
requirement is what I will call “complete identification.” What is required is that the only identifying information about the individual that we will take into
account is the fact that he or she is a member of the
relevant group. That is, the inference from group statistics to individual case is warranted only if we completely
identify the individual as a member of the group. In the
above example, the inference from a statistic about 5%
of the group to a 0.05 probability about a specific individual is warranted only i f no additional information
about the individual is considered relevant, other than
group membership. This “complete identification” requirement can be met by making the inference apply to
a “statistical individual,” a hypothetical member of a
statistical population from which a sample is drawn.c5)
We reach conclusions about statistical individuals whenever we refer to the “median individual” or the “99thpercentile individual.”
A second logical requirement for such a valid direct
inference is “equiprobabi1ity”-a conceptual cousin of
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the classical “principle of indifference.” We can transform the statistic about the group (“incidence = 5%”)
into a probability about a specific person (“probability =
0.05”) ifwe regard the selection of the subject individual
as a “simple random draw” from the group. If every
individual in the group has an equal chance of being selected, then any one selection will have a 0.05 probability
of drawing an individual who will suffer injury.
Thus, we justify the direct inference, first, by completely identifying the individual as simply a member of
the group and, second, by assuming equiprobability of
selection among group members.
These two logical requirements, however, are really
simplifying assumptions. A complete logic of individuation would begin with an estimate of a relevant group
risk (e.g., a statistic such as incidence) and adjust that
estimate up or down depending upon individuating risk
factors, thus amving at a total risk to the specific individual (expressed by a probability). For example, if the
national statistics for automobile fatalities were to yield
a lifetime risk of 1 per 100 persons of dying in an automobile accident, I should not automatically infer that
my probability of dying in a car accident is 0.0 1. I would
need to take into account such individuating factors as
my driving skills, my geographic area of the country,
the time of day that I drive, and my pattern and extent
of automobile use. Other examples of individuating risk
factors are the genetic, developmental and environmental
factors that make my body react in a particular way to
a particular environmental toxin. Biological variation is
the manifestation of such individuating causal factors.
Without such individuating information to tailor the
generic risk to the specific case, the direct inference is
based on an evidentiary data gap that is often filled by
simplifying assumptions about “complete identification” and “equiprobability.” By reaching conclusions
only about statistical individuals and by assuming that
every specific individual has an equal chance of being
those statistical individuals,’@regulators avoid the need
for individuating risk information, as well as the difficult
problem of determining the direction and magnitude of
the individuating adjustment. A specific individual might
have scores on independent variables that lie outside the
range actually studied, might possess characteristics that
are probably relevant but on which there are no data,
and might have other characteristics whose nature and
relevance are completely unknown. Moreover, there
might be interactive effects between relevant factors that
will not be studied in the foreseeable future. Peculiarities
of genetic makeup, developmental process, and environmental history combine to make simplifying assumptions desirable.
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In theory, we could investigate the individuating
risk factors. We could design studies around an individual’s particular characteristics, using subjects whose
genetic compositions, and developmental and environmental histories, are similar to that individual’s. Although we would still have to qualify our conclusions
to reflect inherent methodological uncertain tie^:^) we
could in theory reach conclusions about risk that would
be much more tailored to the particular individual. But
it is clear why society cannot and will not undertake
such a research program. There are problems with technological, ethical, and economic feasibility, as well as
with political acceptability. Witness the difficulties in
obtaining funding to study even distinct subpopulations,
let alone specific individuals. The public health community must set its research priorities based on such considerations as the importance to the society of the type
of injury or illness, the prevalence in the population, the
susceptibility of risk factors to control, the cost of generating information, and other competing demands on
societal resources. The only acceptable social solution is
to explain and predict individual cases only indirectly,
by assuming that they are modeled adequately by feasible studies about groups. But this reality sets up an
inherent tension within risk communication.

2.3. Resulting Tension in Risk Communication
In risk communication, the societal group perspective and the individual perspective inevitably meet. On
the one hand, regulators and scientists are trying to convey to individuals the group information that is available, to use that group information to make decisions
affecting public health and the environment, and to obtain the consent and acceptance of individuals for societal projects. The regulator might also assume that the
group information supports inferences to individual
cases, and that potentially affected individuals should
simply translate group risks into probabilities for themselves. Regulators sometimes imply that individuals who
refuse to do so are acting irrationally.
Individuals, on the other hand, are to some extent
trying to use this group information to reach warranted
conclusions about the risks to themselves as specijic individuals, to their family members, and to their neighbors. Although scientists attempt to estimate variability
in the face of uncertainty, the individual is trying to determine where a specific individual is in the variability
distribution. When a regulator makes a best estimate of
expected incidence of “one in a million,” a member of
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the public may be wondering about the probability that
a specific individual is that one person in a million.
In addition, a potentially affected individual knows
that he or she has not been specijically studied. He or
she intuits the existence of a data gap concerning individuating risk factors. Epidemiologic studies do not
study the specific individual, and experts debate whether
animal results are predictive even for groups of humans,
let alone for specific individuals. The rational individual
may well conclude, depending on the nature of the hazard, that no one knows how well a particular case has
been modeled by the group data or how any specific
individual will be affected.
Furthermore, individuals may resent the regulatory
simplifying assumptions discussed above. They might
resent treating individuals as fungible, as mere members
of a group, and resent assuming that their specific
chances of being adversely affected are the same as
those for everyone else. They want to know what the
chances actually are for specific individuals.
Specific individuals may therefore take seriously
the lack of knowledge concerning individuating risk factors. The fact that the inference gap is logical in nature
suggests that it is not irrational to refuse to make the
simplifying assumptions so essential to regulators. At
most, I as an indwidual might be charged with undue
caution in my decision about how to “deal with” that
gap. But I may be acting very rationally in refusing to
assume it away.
The specific individual, therefore, will probably
employ personal decision rules for how to proceed in
the face of ignorance, just as regulators develop policies
for proceeding under uncertainty. Several points can be
made about such personal decision rules. First, although
the total individual risk might be lower than the group
risk, it is probably more common that the direction and
magnitude of adjustment due to the individuating risk
factors are unknown. This would be the case with those
environmental toxins for which we have incidence predictions, but know very little about the causal mechanism and the role of individuating risk factors. In cases
involving such ignorance, it might be reasonable for an
individual to act as though her total individual risk is
higher than the regulator’s conservative estimate of
group risk.
Second, a reasonable decision about how to deal
with a data gap for individuating risk factors probably
takes into account the expected distribution of benefits
from any societal decision. If the individual is certain to
benefit personally by the societal decision, then it might
be reasonable to tolerate greater uncertainty about the
individuating risk factors.
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Third, a reasonable decision rule might postulate a
right of the potentially affected individual to apply his
or her own personal decision rule. If there is a need to
deal with a data gap concerning individuating risk factors, or a need to balance possible benefits against such
risks, then obtaining the informed consent of all potentially affected individuals might play a major role in the
personal decision rules of many people. I may be willing
to make various decisions affecting myself without understanding my individuating risk factors, but I might
not be willing to impose that personal decision rule on
others.
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can predict what will happen to him, then this is not a
communication problem that can be resolved simply by
increasing good faith or trust.
Of course, the failure of regulators to recognize and
acknowledge the logical problem could increase public
distrust. Part of public distrust might be due to a frustration that regulatory officials do not acknowledge their
ignorance about the individualized risk factors at work
in the specific case. The public is left to wonder whether
officials do not see the logical problem at all, or whether
they are wilfully ignoring it. It is an empirical question
how techniques of acknowledging ignorance might influence public distrust.

2.4. Implications for Empirical Studies
The existence of a data gap with respect to individuating risk factors, and its logical nature, may cause inherent tension within risk communication between
regulators and the public. This difference in perspective
has implications for empirical studies concerning risk.
Instruments to measure risk perception should be sensitive to the difference between an individual’s estimate
of the group risk and his or her estimates of risk to
specific individuals. A number of studies have investigated differences between experts and the public in the
perception of
and some have addressed differences in risk perception as a function of the “target” of
the risk (self, family, people in general).(lO)
Individuals might use different decision rules to
deal with a data gap about individualizing risk factors,
depending upon whether it is a “first-person’’ risk (to
themselves, or to close family members or others with
whom they identify) or a “third-person’’ risk (to strangers).”n.ilJThis difference in decision rules is not the same
phenomenon as “not-in-my-back-yard”: a person in
Maine might be opposed to a proposed federal nuclear
waste repository due to his perception of individualized
risk to an individual in Nevada. We should design survey instruments keeping in mind such differences in perceived individualized risks.
In addition to risk perception studies, empirical
studies of risk communication should also recognize the
distinction between group risk and individual risk. For
example, researchers increasingly study “trust” as an
explanatory variable for human acceptance of regulatory
risk e ~ t i m a t e s . ” ~But
J ~ )the problem of estimating total
individual risk in the face of a data gap about individualizing risk factors is a matter of logic that cannot be
eliminated by trust. Even honest officials may be unable
to fill the individualized data gap with adequate information. If the problem for the individual is that no one

3. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY
STATEMENTS

3.1. Objectivist vs. Subjectivist Interpretations

The communication difficulties caused by the inference gap between group risk and individualized risk
are often compounded by a difference in the meaning of
probability statements. Experts and non-experts can interpret probability statements very differently, and this
can also contribute to confusion within risk communication.
It is traditional, and adequate for purposes of the
present discussion, to divide interpretations of probability statements into two broad approaches or schools: objectivist interpretations and subjectivist interpretat i o n ~ . ( ~ . ’The
” ~ ~disagreement
)
is over what a probability
measures. A standard objectivist interpretation is that a
probability statement is about a relative frequency of occurrence in the long run.‘”) For example, the probability
of dying in an automobile accident estimates the fatality
rate in the relevant population. The objectivist interpretation emphasizes the frequency of the events in which
we are interested, and the nature of the causal systems
producing those events.
By contrast, a typical subjectivist interpretation is
that a probability indicates the degree of confidence that
someone has or should have that an event will ocC U ~ . ( ~ J Probabilities
~J~)
are about the “subjective” mental states of actual people or hypothetical reasonable
people. The probability of dying in an automobile accident might be thought of as expressing the “betting
odds” that such a fatality will occur. The subjectivist
interpretation emphasizes not the frequency of events,
but the limitations of our knowledge about those events,
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and our resulting lack of confidence in making predictions.

3.2. Probabilities for Unique Events
Objectivist and subjectivist interpretations of probability are usually compatible, and they can coexist in
an ambivalent tolerance. An exception to this complementarity, however, is the prediction of a single, unique
event. Objectivist theories have always had difficulty interpreting probability statements about unique events occurring to specific individual^."^) What objectivist
meaning can there be to the assertion that I personally
have a 0.5 probability of developing a certain kind of
cancer within 5 years? My getting cancer or not within
the next 5 years is not a repeatable event, so “relative
frequency of occurrence” has no obvious meaning. An
objectivist is tempted to resolve this problem by interpreting the probability as “really” about cancer incidence in groups of “similar people.”(17) Thus, a
probability statement about my developing cancer is really a statement about the expected incidence of cancer
in a group with relevant characteristics similar to mine.
A subjectivist, by contrast, has no difficulty at all
interpreting probability assertions about unique events,
since all probabilities express degrees of confidence that
an event will occur. A probability of 0.5 expresses the
mental state of equipoise, in which the predictor has no
more confidence in the prediction than in its negation.
From the standpoint of confidence, it matters not at all
whether the prediction is about a specific individual or
about a group.

3.3. Resulting Misunderstandings in Risk
Communication
Many regulators and public health scientists naturally intend an objectivist interpretation for their probability assertions. First, since regulators usually rely on
empirical data about group incidence and severity, they
also tend to think of their conclusions in terms of fiequency. For example, from tumor incidence in a sample
of test animals they might infer a worst-case incidence
in a human population. Second, they tend to believe that
disease occurs with cause-and-effect regularity, and that
most causal processes produce their effects regardless of
human degrees of confidence. Moreover, in communicating risk to the public, they might see themselves as
trying to replace uninformed, subjective fears with ob-
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jective information. For all of these professional reasons,
they tend to interpret probabilities objectively.
But the member of the public who wishes to know
what is going to happen to a specific individual is concerned about unique events. “Will this nuclear reactor
ever melt down?” “Will my daughter develop cancer
due to exposure to this chemical?” This nuclear reactor
will either melt down or not, and my daughter can live
only one future. I accept probability assertions about the
hture largely because I understand the limitations of human knowledge, and because I am intuitively aware of
the data gap at the heart of the direct inference problem.
But these “facts of life” also encourage me to interpret
probability statements in a subjectivist fashion, as expressing the speaker’s degree of confidence in the prediction.
In risk communication, the objective and subjective
interpretations of probability statements can clash in
conhsing ways. For example, an objectivist-oriented
regulator might interpret a “one in a million” risk as a
worst-case estimate of expected additional cancer incidence in the exposed group. Statistical devices that characterize the uncertainty around that prediction, such as
confidence intervals, do not change the nature of the
prediction: it is still an estimate of frequency of occurrence. The objectivist communicator understands the
probability as predicting a very small incidence (worst
case), and expects the public to be reassured by this fact.
A member of the public, however, might interpret
the “one in a million” probability in a subjectivist way,
as indicating the regulator’s high degree of confidence
that no one will develop cancer. But if that is what the
probability means, the individual may be puzzled by the
basis for such high confidence. First, even such high
confidence in group predictions is questionable, especially if the evidentiq basis consists of animal data
showing that the chemical agent can sometimes cause
cancer in animals. Second, there may appear to be no
basis for confidence in a prediction for any spec@ individual, given the problem of direct inference. Even if
the best group prediction is in fact “one in a million,”
the absence of individuating data should lower any subjective confidence that I will not be the affected individual. If the probability assertion expresses degree of
confidence, not relative frequency, then it may be difficult to understand the basis for the regulator’s apparently
high degree of confidence.
If there can be sound logical reasons for an individual to resist making the direct inference from group
risk to individual risk, this inference problem can be
compounded by differences in interpreting probability
statements about risk. By making a probability estimate
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of “one in a million,” a regulator may intend to make
the well-founded (objectivist) claim: “I can’t be very
confident at all, but my best prediction based on limited
evidence is that at most one or two additional cancer
cases will occur per million people in the population.”
But a member of the public hearing this probability may
interpret the low probability estimate as expressing a
high degree of confidence on the part of the regulator
that no individual will develop cancer from the exposure. The public might hear the unfounded (subjectivist)
statement: “I’m very, very confident that you won’t get
cancer from this exposure.” These are very different interpretations, and can generate a great deal of risk miscommunication. As a result, the regulator might perceive
the public as irrational and distrusting, and the public
might view the regulator as acting from bad faith, naivete, or ignorance.

4. ADDRESSING THE CONCEPTUAL GULF IN
RISK COMMUNICATION
The two conceptual problems discussed in this article are separate and distinct. The inferential gap from
statistics about groups to conclusions about individuals
is an evidentiary problem, while the objectivist-subjectivist distinction concerns the meaning of probability
statements. The evidentiary gap concerning individuating risk factors can be viewed in either objectivist or
subjectivist terms, and objectivists and subjectivists must
both address the direct inference problem. The compound difficulty for risk communication is that both of
these conceptual problems intersect when a member of
the public is worried about probabilistic assessments of
the risk to specific individuals. This combination creates
a complicated conceptual gulf between the parties to the
communication. The lack of information about individuating factors combines with the confusion about the
meaning of probability statements to produce miscommunication. Moreover, this source of miscommunication
complicates such additional problems as misunderstanding scientific information, misperceiving group risk, and
mistrusting public officials.
Despite the confusion, it is important to attempt to
separate this conceptual‘gulf from the other types of
problems. This gulf might not be bridged, or even significantly narrowed, by additional data or empirical studies about the magnitude of group risk. Additional studies
about causal risk factors usually change only the group
statistics, without significantly narrowing the direct inference data gap. Lowering the point estimate of future
group incidence, or contracting the confidence interval
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around that estimate, might not reassure the at-risk individual.
It is possible that research expressly addressing this
conceptual gulf might lead to more successful strategies
for dealing with the problem. First, although some studies have touched on the extent to which the direct inference gap actually influences a population’s thinking
about r i~ k , ( ~ J*this
- * ~effect
)
should be studied explicitly.
The suggestions for study design made in Section 2.4
above would be relevant for such studies. Most members
of the public are concerned to some extent with both the
total risk to the community and the individualized risk
to themselves or specific others. Empirical studies measuring the relative importance of these two perspectives
in public thinking might show that questions about individualized risk sometimes play a psychologically minor role. I suspect, however, that we will find that
worries about individuation predominate among individuals who are personally at risk. Such worries might also
predominate when biological variability plays a greater
role in producing an effect (for example, susceptibility
to a weak environmental toxin emitted from a waste incinerator) than when a single set of physical forces
drives outcomes (for example, in a nuclear reactor meltdown).
Second, it might be possible to develop analytical
techniques to extract more individuating information
from group studies. Perhaps summary statistics about
groups can be supplemented with integrative techniques
centered on individuals. While research into distinct subgroups-such
as women, children, and racial subgroups-are movements toward the individual, we have
a long way to go down that road. Although we will
never completely close the logical gap between groups
and individuals, we may be able to use available data to
provide risk information to the public in a way that assists them to make direct inferences to specific individuals.
Third, studies might be undertaken to investigate
the types of personal decision rules that people actually
use to deal with data gaps concerning individuating risk
factor^.(^^-^^) This information might lead to suggestions
for providing information to the public that they will
regard as useful and responsive to their decisional
needs.
Finally, it should be useful to study more effective
means of communicating probabilistic information, taking into account the different ways of interpreting probability statements. This problem is, after all, a problem
of meaning, rather than a gap in evidence. The task is
learning how to communicate relative frequency estimates, while at the same time communicating the in-
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tended degree of confidence in those estimates, without
getting these two tasks hopelessly confused.
Any adequate solution for risk communication will
have to recognize that the conceptual differences discussed here are real and fundamental. Individuals are
often acting very rationally in refusing to apply directly
to themselves the regulator’s risk estimates for a population. And if the public is being rational, then trying to
“educate” them out of being so is not only doomed to
failure, but probably unethical.
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